Abstract-To achieve end-to-end security in a system built from parts, it is important to ensure that the composition of secure components is itself secure. This work investigates the compositionality of two popular conditions of possibilistic noninterference. The first condition, progress-insensitive noninterference (PINI), is the security condition enforced by practical tools like JSFlow, Paragon, sequential LIO, Jif, FlowCaml, and SPARK Examiner. We show that this condition is not preserved under fair parallel composition: composing a PINI system fairly with another PINI system can yield an insecure system. We explore constraints that allow recovering compositionality for PINI. Further, we develop a theory of compositional reasoning. In contrast to PINI, we show what PSNI behaves well under composition, with and without fairness assumptions. Our work is performed within a general framework for nondeterministic interactive systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modularity and compositionality are essential for the design and construction of modern computing systems. A major challenge is secure composition: to achieve end-to-end security in a system built from parts, it is important to ensure that the composition of secure components is itself secure. Secure composition is particularly intricate because security conditions are often fragile under system behavior modifications. Adding, removing, or modifying a single trace or event can break the security of a system [32] . This paper studies the foundations of secure composition. Our focus is on specifying confidentiality (or dual flavors of integrity [9] , [10] ) by defining what constitutes secure information flow through computing systems.
a) State of the art in security for interactive systems:
Given the importance of the subject, it is not surprising that literature has explored security of communicating systems and their composition in assorted settings, discussed in detail in Section VI. Unfortunately, the models underlying previous frameworks on formalising and enforcing secure information flow [4] , [12] , [21] , [34] , [37] , [42] , [51] are all very different, and largely lacking relative comparison. Models range from memory-to-memory transformers, memory-to-outputstream transformers, input-to-output-stream transformers, and input-output-trace emitters. The frameworks make different fundamental assumptions, e.g. determinism, synchronous communication, environment totality, and fixed interaction pattern, leading to different notions of observation and environment.
For example, security has been addressed in reactive systems (e.g., [2] , [12] , [43] ). The reactive system models considered exercise a restrictive pattern of communication, where the system waits for an input, and once an input has been received it proceeds with executing an appropriate handler until completion, possibly producing some output on the way. Event systems have been a focus of several previous approaches (e.g., [28] , [29] , [54] , [57] ). Events in the early work have different levels of sensitivity with the goal of protecting both presence and content of events but not distinguishing between the two. Interaction patterns in some of this work are fixed; Wittbold and Johnson [54] assume the pattern of receiving a secret and a public event, followed by sending a secret and public event. With process calculi as the underlying models, a line of work (e.g., [19] , [22] , [23] , [40] , [46] , [47] ) studies secure interaction, inheriting concrete features from the process calculus and not distinguishing between the sensitivity of presence and content of events. More general, and closer to our work, are formalizations that operate on labeled transition systems [16] , [37] , [42] . However, these model environments as strategies, which are separate from the computational model. Strategies are total, i.e., can always receive and send messages.
Thus, key questions that have not been addressed by previous work are: (i) what is an appropriate general model of security of interactive systems, (ii) how to distinguish sensitivity of message presence and content in such a model, (iii) how do we model environments as part of the system, and (iv) how do we provide flexible ways for composing systems. b) Progress-sensitive and progress-insensitive security:
The focus of our work is two popular security conditions. The first condition, progress-insensitive noninterference (PINI) [3] , [4] , [12] , prevents information leaks from secret sources to public sinks, but allows secrets to affect progress of public computation. Thanks to the liberty it provides for handling loop constructs, this condition is a popular target for such practical security tools as JSFlow [21] , Paragon [14] , sequential LIO [51] , Jif [34] , FlowCaml [50] , and SPARK Examiner [6] . The second condition is progress-sensitive noninterference (PSNI) [4] , [12] , [37] , [43] , which does not allow leaks via progress. The advantage of PSNI is that it provides stronger security guarantees that is not susceptible to laundering secrets by brute-force attacks [3] or re-running programs [11] . An important question that has not been answered by previous work is (v) how do PINI and PSNI behave under composition? c) Contributions: Motivated by questions (i)-(v), this paper delivers the following contributions. The first contribution is a general security framework to model security of interactive systems. Given the diversity of previous work, our goal is to avoid "another information-flow model" with no relation to previous approaches. This motivates us to systematize and generalize the work in the area so far. We obtain full generality by adopting labeled transition systems as the underlying model. Our asynchronous input-output-stream emitters (Definition II.6) can model nondeterminism, nonblocking input, and arbitrary interaction patterns. In contrast to previous work, environments are interactive systems, a significant generalization of previous work. The expressiveness of the environment model is key for compositionality results. Unifying the assumptions on environments and systems provides us with a generic system model. More importantly, it also paves the way for secure composition thanks to the possibility that systems and environments can be manipulated interchangeably. The second contribution is combinators for composing systems. The combinators allow flexibility in how exactly composed components can interact with each other. This is in contrast to previous work where composition is typically restricted to a single way. The third contribution allows us further generality in the modeling of interaction: we distinguish between the sensitivity of message presence and message content without restricting communication paradigms. The fourth contribution is the study of compositionality for PINI and PSNI. We find that PINI is not preserved under fair parallel composition: composing a PINI system fairly with another PINI system can yield an insecure system, and thus, compositionality of PINI relies fundamentally on unfairness. We explore constraints that allow recovering compositionality for PINI. Further, we develop a theory of compositional reasoning. In contrast to PINI, we show what PSNI behaves well under composition, with and without fairness assumptions.
d) Organization:
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the general setting of interactive systems, as specified by labeled transition systems. Section III presents the security definitions. Section IV establishes compositionality properties for a core of combinators, with and without fairness assumptions. Section V demonstrates the generality of our results by providing a rich language of secure combinators. Section VI reports on related work. Section VII offers conclusions and points to worthwhile future work.
II. INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS
We present a language-independent framework for reasoning about the behavior of interactive programs. The framework functions as the foundation for our technical contribution, and unifies several previous frameworks for interactive program security [12] , [16] , [37] , [42] , [43] .
A. Computation Model
Our model of computation is a labeled transition system (LTS). An LTS is a triple (P, A, − ); P is a set (of processes), ranged by p, A is a set (of action labels), ranged by a, and − ⊆ P × A × P (a labeled transition relation). Computation occurs in discrete steps (transitions). The label on a step is the effect of said step. These effects are the only external interface to our processes; they are "black boxes" in every other respect. Here, !cv (resp. ?cv ) denotes a message sent (resp. received) on channel c carrying value v . We let i , o, m, c and v range over I, O, M, C and V, respectively. To model noninteraction (e.g. evaluating a loop condition), we distinguish a channel for internal actions, and denote a message on it by . The program receiving value 0 on channel sensor, then receiving a 1, and subsequently outputting 1 on alert, is then represented by the following transition sequence.
B. Behaviors
To study the behavior of an LTS IO , we consider sequences of actions performed by it.
Traces T, ranged over by t, are (finite) lists of actions. For instance, with " " denoting the empty trace and "." the constructor ("cons") operator, t s = ! .?sensor1.! .!alert1. is a trace. Alternatively, T could be defined as T = A * , i.e., the Kleene closure of A, or inductively, by asserting that ∈ T, and specifying, given an action a and a trace t ∈ T, how to obtain a new trace in T (a.t ∈ T). For simplicity, we usually omit the trailing a nonempty trace, use "." to also denote trace concatenation ( .t = t and (a.t ).t = a.(t .t)), and write t n for the concatenation of t n times (t 0 = and t n+1 = t.t n ). We write t ≤ t when t = t.t for some t . Streams S, ranged over by s, are (strictly) infinite lists of actions (S exists and is unique [7] ). For instance, with "." denoting the deconstructor operator, s s for which (.) s s = (! ,ŝ s ) and (.)ŝ s = (?sensor0, s s ) is a stream, i.e., the infinite repetition of action sequence ! .?sensor0. Alternatively, S could be defined as S = A ω , i.e., the language of all infinite words over A, or coinductively, by specifying, given a stream s ∈ S, how to obtain an action and a new stream in S (apply "." on s). For simplicity, we let a.s denote any stream s for which (.) s = (a, s), and let t ω = t.(t ω ). Define t ≤ s and t.s the same way as for traces. For more on coinduction, see [24] . Due to the nature of PINI and due to the observation in Section III-D, we focus on stream semantics in this paper, which, under the right assumptions, are at least as expressive as trace semantics. First, the following is easy to see.
(s-all-t) However, the following does not hold in general. 
−− , since p R always performs an arbitrary finite number of !zero0 actions. So there are scenarios where trace semantics is less expressive than stream semantics; trace semantics, depending on perspective, hides the eventuality of !eof0 in p R , or hides its possible noneventuality in p L . However, in productive LTS IO , this difference in expressiveness occurs only in the presence of unbounded nondeterminism (by König's lemma) [45] , present in p R as it nondeterministically picks a number n from the full range of natural numbers, in a single computation step.
We assume LTS IO are productive, wlg. since any LTS IO can be modeled as a productive LTS IO , as follows. We model termination as an action by distinguishing a termination channel, and denoting any message on said channel by . The obituary wrapper O announces termination of the wrapped process.
The zombie wrapper Z keeps terminated processes productive by enabling the ! action in terminal states.
C. Comparing Behaviors
To reason about the behavior of processes, we need ways to compare behaviors. Comparing traces is easily done component-wise, and a proof of trace equality is inductive (thus finite). What about infinite streams? One way is to define stream equivalence as non-difference (nonexistence of a derivation in an inductively defined difference relation). We instead use a coinductive definition which captures the idea of component-wise trace equality (note that ∀s ∃!a, s s 
ω , s 0s = s 0e . An inductive proof of difference would use the fact that !zero0.!zero0 ≤ s 0s and !zero0.!zero0 s 0e ; this leads us to the following useful observation, proven by Park in [39] .
(=-and-ts)
Ultimately, we need to compare observable behavior to reason about information-flow security of processes. We define observables in Section III; for now, let • range over unobservable actions. Furthermore, we let • function as a wildcard (multiple occurrences of • in the same context can represent different mathematical objects). Observational equivalence then becomes component-wise equality of observables. To obtain the next observable action, we use the following "weak" labeled transition relation: 
(≈-and-ts)
We close with a justification for focusing on stream semantics as a basis for comparing the behavior or processes. As noted earlier, actions are the only external interface to our processes. Thus, when reasoning about security, we model attacker knowledge obtained via extensional observations. Here, not allowing the attacker to observe the state of the process is natural. This makes branching-time equivalence (bisimulation on processes) too strict for our purposes, since it makes distinctions on the internal branching structure of processes [35] . We therefore opt for stream equivalence: a linear-time behavioral equivalence which subsumes trace equivalence
D. Interaction
The input-output behavior in the LTS IO semantics of a program implies a particular model of interaction used by said program. Typically, secure information flow frameworks in the reactive, process algebra, and interactive program setting, adopt synchronous communication on channels as the model of communication [12] , [16] , [19] , [22] , [37] , [40] , [42] , [43] , [47] . Here, if we take the processes in these computation models and put them in interaction, then processes can block on both input and output. We argue that synchronous communication is not a good fit for general system composition, as the exhibited blocking behavior makes (compositional) reasoning about process behavior nontrivial. Progress of synchronously interactive programs is highly context sensitive, as nonwillingness of one component to receive can halt the progress of a sender component. For instance, consider the following LTS IO .
?a0
Consider p M in interaction with p R . These components can synchronize b0, and under an inert environment, this synchronization will (eventually) occur. However, merely by adding p L , a component which sends no messages, the eventuality of b0 is no longer guaranteed, as there is a (fair) scheduling which starves it: let (p L , p M ) synchronize first, and then let (p M , p R ) synchronize if they can; otherwise synchronize (p L , p M ) twice. The same situation arises if we reverse the direction of b.
In practice, output blocking is typically avoided by buffering channels, making communication asynchronous. Then, p R would put !b0 into a buffer without delay and move on with its computation, while p M would subsequently read from the buffer whenever p M is ready to do so. However, this effect is also achieved by requiring that there is always a receiver ready for each send. This holds if each component in a composition is always ready to receive input, i.e., input total [27] , [30] . Input totality simplifies reasoning about composed systems considerably [29] , [57] , as an input-total process cannot control its environment by not desiring certain input. Input totality abstracts from how asynchrony is achieved. Thus, our framework generalizes more concrete approaches e.g. input queues [52] and buffered channels [48] . To make fairness visible in an interaction stream, we ensure each component is always able to perform an action, regardless of which environment it is in. We get this by assuming that processes are output productive, i.e., always capable of producing output. This makes our processes similar to Input/Output Automata [27] , in that processes are autonomous; a process can always make progress on its outputs. This is in contrast to asynchrony in process algebra (e.g. [23] ), where output is only sent when a receiver is ready. Like in [27] , we say a stream is fair if it contains an infinite number of outputs, i.e., is in the set
Since ! models noninteraction, receivers of ! should not react to it. Such receivers are atemporal. For further justification and merits of this model of concurrency, see Section VI.
p is interactive iff p satisfies 1), 2) and 3). ♦
Putting two interactive LTS IO in nonblocking interaction is now a simple matter of making all output of one process become the only input to the other (and vice versa). We write
, and similarly for streams. We refer to p here as the environment of p, and we will study the behavior of p under different environments when reasoning about security of p. This is in stark contrast with previous work on security of LTS IO [16] , [37] , [42] which considers (classes of) strategies as environments, i.e., functions of type T → C → P(V). One noteworthy feature which secure penvironments have over secure strategy-environments is p can force a secret input to occur before a public input, as input streams can in the reactive systems setting [12] ; indeed, if p and p are deterministic, and the interaction pattern is fixed, p will behave like an input stream. Our framework thus unifies several previous frameworks for interactive program security.
We assume p is interactive throughout our development, unless stated otherwise. While these are strong restrictions to impose on an LTS IO , any LTS IO can be modeled as an interactive LTS IO . For instance, for p which can discriminate on which channel to receive on next, like the LTS IO in [16] , [37] , [42] , the buffer wrapper B
? associates an input queue with each channel, which p can then receive on at its leisure. B
? (p) is input total, for any p.
For programs which never discriminate on which channel to receive from, like the LTS IO in [12] , [43] , [58] , the FIFO wrapper F ? buffers input and delivers it to p on demand, in FIFO order. For such p,
Any p which is not output productive has the potential to block on input. The wait wrapper W empowers any such p with the ability to, instead of block, wait as an internal action. For any p, W(p) is output productive.
At last, the atemporal wrapper T ignores any ? actions. T(p) is atemporal, for any p.
III. SECURITY OF INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS
Equipped with the tools from the previous section, we develop notions of information-flow security in our setting. We present two popular conditions of possibilistic noninterference: PSNI and PINI. While PSNI is well studied in our setting [16] , [37] , [42] , we give the first formalization of PINI in a general interactive setting; PINI has thus far only been presented in settings with restricted forms of interaction [3] , [12] .
A. Observables
The observables of a process are its effects. We assume a lattice (L, ), with L ranged by , of security levels expressing levels of confidentiality. Each channel c is labeled with two security levels; π(c) is the level of the presence of a message on c, and κ(c) is the level of the content, or value, of a message on c. In examples, we frequently represent a channel by its security levels, writing κ(c) π(c) in place of c. A classic example is the lattice L = {L, H} ("low" (public) and "high"
and H H , respectively. We let resp. ⊥ denote the top resp. bottom element in the security lattice. Let $ ::= ? | ! and define π($cv ) = π(c) and κ($cv ) = κ(c). Since timingsensitive reasoning is beyond the scope of this paper, we set π($ ) = κ($ ) = . For termination-sensitive reasoning in this framework, set π($ ) = κ($ ) = ⊥ and impose a restriction similar to atemporal for termination actions.
The security labels express who can observe what. An observer is associated a security level . An -observer is capable of observing the presence (resp. content) of messages on c if π(c) (resp. κ(c) ). Let s be the stream where, component-wise, each action has been replaced with what an -observer observes in the action: 
B. Noninterference
The idea behind noninterference is as follows. Assume an -observer observes all he is privileged to observe. A process is noninterfering if, based on -observables, the -observer learns nothing he is not privileged to learn, i.e., unobservable input does not interfere with observable behavior. Noninterfering processes are thereby not responsible for leaks (in our possibilistic setting, this means any difference in observable behavior must be attributable to nondeterministic choices).
To attribute a detected insecurity to the process under scrutiny, we study its behavior under secure environments. Typically, definitions of noninterference state that a process exhibits observably equivalent behavior, under any pair of noninterfering observably equivalent environments. In our setting, this leads to a circularity, since environments are processes. Previous work avoids this circularity by a) using simpler environments for which noninterference and observational equivalence are trivial [3] , [19] , [37] , b) defining observational equivalence on processes, and noninterference as self-equivalence [12] , [49] , or c) defining noninterference as invariance of observable behavior to insertion/deletion of unobservable input [25] .
We find that none of these approaches can be applied directly to our setting. Since compositionality is a main concern in this paper, we need environments to be part of the computation model, ruling out a). Since self-equivalences are bisimulation relations, they are branching-time equivalences, rejecting e.g. the following program p linear , since it can enter the "else" branch, where it can leak information, even through it can also always take the "then" branch on x, where no information leaks. We therefore find b) too strict.
Here, poll c x is a nonblocking input interacting with a buffering context, similar to if-receive in [48] . If a c-input is waiting in the buffer, consume it. Otherwise, write UNDEFINED to x. Formallyà la [42] (with
Approaches based on c) are defined on traces, and have similar problems as b) in that they reject the above program; inserting ?H1 immediately after ! .!H0 in ! .!H0.! k .!L0 makes the subsequent !L0 impossible (since !H0 fixes x to 0).
What we desire is a property which stipulates that a process can (by making the appropriate nondeterministic choices) preserve the possibility of a sequence of observables, under insertion of unobservable input during execution. To ensure that a stream is not only possible due to the presence of unobservable input, we require the above for streams which contain no unobservable input, i.e., streams over
Since a process cannot leak information if denied the opportunity to produce output, we focus on fair runs of processes. We define the above as a coinductive predicate as follows.
, is the largest predicate satisfying each of the following. v ) and when the next observable action is an input; p must be able to choose a s ∈ A ω matching the rest of s 0 . 3) states that when there are no more observable output remaining to be matched, p can be scheduled fairly while still preserving possibility of s 0 ; when p is being fed a stream of input, p can at some point cut into the (otherwise infinite) stream of inputĩ after a (finite) trace of inputsī ≤ĩ and produce an unobservable output o.
When devising our properties, we encountered three challenging scenarios which our properties needed to deal with to guarantee eventuality of actions: i) scheduling, ii) high interaction loops, and iii) high output starvation. In i), since both p and its environment can be the producer behind the kth action in an interaction, p might only be able to choose a matching s if p produces the next message. However, the demand p places on its possibilistic scheduling may conflict with the demands of the environment. This is the case when both p and its environment only preserve confidentiality if they each are the producer behind the first message in the interaction. Having one yield fully to the demands of the other makes the security properties stipulate security for all schedulers, which implies security under scheduler refinement [59] . While interesting, we find this to be too conservative; we wish for our scheduler to be possibilistic (and therefore a source of nondeterminism which can conceal information leaks). In ii), future observables can be starved as a result of either unfortunate scheduling, or H input. To illustrate, consider e.g. the following process p loop . After receiving ?H0, this process insists on outputting H0 before outputting L0. If the environment insists (to not leak) on outputting H0 before receiving L0, action !L0 is deferred, possibly indefinitely, as is possible when p loop interacts with a variant of itself which first outputs H0. The process and its environment here are engaged in a livelock, exhibiting behavior reminiscent of a "hallway dance", or more accurately, an Alphonse-Gaston routine ("After you", followed by a backand-forth "No, you first." ad infinitum) [38] . In the presence of high interaction loops, security must ensure that p can eventually produce its next observable, regardless of what environment p is run under. Dually, the environment must tolerate receiving the next observable at any point in time, as different processes under it can demand high interaction loops terminated at different times. Thus 2) additionally guarantees possible eventual termination of high interaction loops between a secure p interacting with a secure environment (at the whim of the producer of the next observable), addressing i) and ii). Finally, 3) is designed to address iii), e.g., to ensure that after p has produced all its observables, it can still be scheduled fairly. Consider this example of high output starvation, p starve . Our "preservation-based noninterference" can be viewed as a hybrid of b) and c). In contrast to b), we do not require security to hold in all reachable states. In contrast to c), we do not require that each s ∈ S(p) satisfies insert/delete conditions; only that some s R s does, i.e. that p can make the right nondeterministic choices to preserve the possibility of R s.
is the first definition of PINI in a general nondeterministic interactive setting. It differs from previous PINI formalizations [3] , [4] , [12] in that input to the process is not fixed before the process is run; rather, the environment is permitted to adapt its input based on prior process output. Our definition can be improved, however; consider p echo , a process which outputs anything it receives in FIFO order ( ω is lost. Thus, in general, a p satisfying Definition III.4 might have to starve the environment to ≈ -match a stream. This is not unlike ID-security in [12] , which allows a reactive system to ignore an observable input ready in the environment by diverging silently while reacting to a previous input. While we could adjust our definition of ≈ to cover the above scenario, the main reason we introduce PINI is to study how it behaves under composition, and the adjusted PINI would fail to compose in the same ways our PINI does.
PSNI is strictly stronger than PINI. This follows from Definition III.2, Lemma II.5 and this program which, wrapped 
C. Noninterference Under Environments
To facilitate evaluation of the relative merits of our preservation-based formalization of progress-(in)sensitive noninterference, and to demonstrate the generality of our framework, we give more conventional definitions of PSNI and PINI under environmentsà la [16] , [37] , [42] . For our preservation-based definitions to be useful on their own, they need to be stronger than the standard environmentbased definitions; then we will know processes satisfying our preservation-based definitions are safe against all attacks which processes satisfying the environment-based definition are safe against. This is the case; the proof is in the appendix.
We suspect the reverse implication of these theorems to be false. To show that p satisfies the constraint imposed by Definition III.1 pt. 2) using assumption p ∈ PINI E , it seems we need to propose an environment which outputs a different observable if it receives an unobservable first. However, such an environment is not PSNI (resp. PINI). These theorems give us a sense of assurance, however; if a property is too weak, say, P = {p ∈ LTS IO | p is interactive}, then p ∈ P =⇒ p ∈ P E , since P E places demands on p beyond p ∈ P.
For similar reasons as for Lemma III.12, PSNI E is strictly stronger than PINI E .
Lemma III.12. p ∈ PSNI E =⇒ p ∈ PINI E Finally, we consider to which extent PSNI E (resp. PINI E ) permits processes to starve the environment to preserve confidentiality. A process starving the environment is exerting control over the possibilistic scheduling of processes, which violates our desire for processes to be autonomous. Therefore, ideally, PSNI E and PINI E should reject processes which might need to starve the environment to preserve confidentiality. 
D. Contrast to Trace-based Properties
Finally, to emphasize the novelty of our security properties, we demonstrate that they rule out classes of attacks which trace-based security properties, classically considered in work on compositionality in event systems [28] , [32] , [57] , do not guarantee protection from. Consider the following program, which we refer to as the extortionist.
repeat poll However, p extort does, for instance, satisfy forward correctability [25] . This is due to the fact that forward correctability is defined in terms of a trace semantics, and therefore cannot properly deal with the definite (non)eventuality of !L0. Pick a t ∈ T(p extort ). If t has the L output, then for any t = t .t and ?Hv , there will be at with no H input for which t L t .?Hv .t . Similarly if a H input is deleted. If t does not have the L output, then regardless of whether a H input is inserted or deleted, settingt = will L -match t.
IV. COMPOSITIONAL SECURITY
To study how our security properties behave under composition, we present a minimal combinator language for building systems from parts. The core of this language is complete in the sense that arbitrary wirings between components can be constructed, yet structured in the sense that the possible routes that data can take in the composed system are clearly defined by the combinators used (as opposed to being partially defined by the (un)willingness of components to synchronize on certain channels at different times).
A. First Attempt
A minimal approach to enable two processes in a composed system to interact is to introduce a loop combinator , illustrated in Figure 1 . This is the approach taken in functional reactive programming [36] , where loops and simple products (e.g. ⊕ in Figure 3 ) enable modeling of arbitrary wirings.
In p , output from p is sent to the environment, and immediately, a copy of said output is sent into p as input. Any input to p is handed to p. The semantics of is as follows. 
Convenient as this combinator is, it enables a process to engage in a high interaction loop with itself. While it is possible to schedule p loop ∈ PSNI under an arbitrary environment s.t. !L0 eventually occurs, this is not the case for p loop ; while
|= p loop cannot match this behavior; to do ?L0 without producing !L0, p loop must consume ?H0. This sends p loop to its leftmost state, whereto it returns directly after performing !H0, as the next action of p loop is invariably !H0. While this poses no problems for PINI (since a high-interaction-looping process emits infinite silence), removes the degree of control a wrapped process needs to have for PSNI to be preserved under .
B. Core Combinators
The issue with is that it can prevent the source of an output from making progress on its observable productions, by immediately following each output it makes with an input sent directly to the source. Therefore, if our combinators are to compose under PSNI, they need to at most enable output to reach any part of the system except its source, in one step of the whole system. We provide two combinators which we deem to be core combinators, sufficient to construct arbitrary such wirings: "and", and "route".
These each take (possibly compound) interactive LTS IO as parameter and yield a compound interactive LTS IO . The structure that they impose is illustrated in Figure 2 .
1) and:
The and combinator produces a composite system from parts. An input to p 1 p 2 is sent to both p 1 and p 2 , while output from p 1 p 2 comes from exactly one of p 1 and p 2 , and is copied into the other as input, thus exhibiting feedback. This combinator is the enabler of communication, functioning as the "glue" with which we wire together larger systems from parts. Our combinator most closely resembles the (full, arbitrary, hook-up) binary composition typically used in event-based formalisms [28] , or alternatively, a broadcasting variant [41] of parallel composition in process algebra [19] . The semantics of is as follows. It is clear that is associative and commutative.
2) router: The router combinator wraps an LTS IO in a context which routes messages. The routing is defined by a router function r : A → A satisfying r(I) ⊆ I, r(O) ⊆ O and r($ ) = $ . Then in r p , an output o leaving p is replaced with r(o), and when an input i arrives at r p , r(i ) is received by p.
Whereas is an enabler of flows, where a composed system wires each output to each component (save the output source), can be used to control which underlying component receive which input, and to hide certain output from certain components. One example of the use of r is to map input actions on a particular channel (i.e., carrying high data) to ? to put the channel out of scope of the wrapped process. The semantics of are the following.
C. Point-to-Point Variant
Instead of our broadcasting message-passing semantics, one could alternatively opt for one which, instead of sending a message along both branches of a split arrow, sends it along exactly one of them. This yields a point-to-point messagepassing semantics (which is still asynchronous), represented by the "xor" combinator.
1) xor:
The xor combinator is similar to parallel composition in point-to-point message-passing formalisms [19] . While the component wiring in is the same as for , the message-passing semantics differs notably: Input goes to exactly one component, and output goes exclusively to either the other component, or the environment. The semantics of is as follows. It is clear that is associative and commutative.
Using and as the combinator core would be viable in a synchronous concurrency model; there, input is only delivered to an intended receiver. However, in a setting where each component always waits for input on every channel, nondeterministically picks a component to receive the input. The input can therefore be sent along a branch in the composition which is not intended to receive the input (a constraint modeled using a router which maps it to ? ) and therefore never reach the intended target. We therefore find that is not a good fit in our framework -at least not as a replacement for . There are some merits to including in a language based on our combinator core, e.g. if, at the combinator level, one wishes to model nondeterministic dispatching of input to servers.
D. Compositionality
We now explore the compositionality of our security properties, to then give a language of secure combinators for building secure systems from secure parts. While security properties are known to be fragile under composition [32] , the proof technique arising from the design of our security properties yields positive results.
We consider compositionality of both and since they cannot be easily defined in terms of each other; and have no source of nondeterminism needed to model the nondeterministic behavior of (although this can be supplied by an LTS IO ), and no combination of and can guarantee eventual delivery between any pair of components like can.
1) and:
We begin with the most important combinator, . It composes under PSNI.
The proof of this is as follows. For any
We obtain s by "zipping" s L and s R in a manner guided by the observables in s L and s R (observables in both are the same as observables in s modulo direction) as follows:
We show existence ofŝ 
i , and t = t.i , and we get (*).
Assumeŝ L ŝ R (equally valid proof obtained by swapping L and R in the following).
, and t = t.o L , and we get (*). 
o, and use the above-described approach to obtainŝ from these, and we get (+).
, and use the abovedescribed approach to obtainŝ from these, and we get (+).
the same argument with L and R swapped also holds), we get through single application of Def. III.
ī .o, and use the above-described approach to obtainŝ from these, and we get (+).
Thus preserve p L p R ,s ( , s ), which completes this proof.
Furthermore, it turns out that PINI composes under , if we e.g. change the wayŝ L andŝ R are zipped to form s such that if one runs out of observables, say, s L , then the rest of s is set to the rest of s L .
2) xor: The proof that PSNI and PINI compose under is similar to the above "zip-and-preserve" proof of compositionality of . Since environment input does not enter both components, and since output from a component does not both go to the environment and the other component, the zipping procedure consults s in addition toŝ L andŝ R since s tells us where observables in s L and s R came from and went to.
3) route: Since a router can route any message to any channel, and change values in messages, a router has the capacity to reveal the presence of H-presences message or values in H-content messages. However, as long as a router function never moves information down in the security lattice, wrapping a secure process in it yields a secure process.
We say r is secure if it is -secure for all . ♦
Compositionality of is immediate from Definition III.1.
Corollary IV.9. p ∈ PINI =⇒ r p ∈ PINI for secure r.
E. Fairness
As we have discussed, autonomy, and therefore fairness, is a key feature of interactive LTS IO . However, the proof we just saw does not rule out the possibility of starvation. For instance, in the zipper given in the proof of , whenŝ L has an infinite number of observables andŝ R has no observable output, the zipper can ignore the remainder ofŝ R . Also, the PINI zipper ignores the remainder ofŝ R whenŝ L has no more observables. The central question here is whether our security properties require starvation of components to remain compositional. This prompts us to study fair combinators. What we find is that whereas PSNI composes freely assuming fairness, PINI relies fundamentally on lack of fairness to be compositional for even simple product compositions.
1) Fair Composition:
A fair combinator permits only fair behaviors, i.e., ones which do not starve components, always allowing each to eventually make progress on its outputs.
We let F be defined in a similar manner.
2) PSNI Composes Fairly:
Modifying the zip-and-preserve proof above for the compositionality of PSNI under F and F is easy; whenŝ R runs out of observable output, we zip in such a way thatŝ takes turns in pulling an output fromŝ R and s L into t, irrespective of when and how many input appears before the outputs. We therefore have the following.
3) PINI Composes Unfairly: However, the same cannot be said for PINI; it fails to be preserved under even simple fair products. The way in which PINI fails to compose is not due to the simplification we made of the definition of PINI discussed in Section III-B. We therefore maintain that, in the interactive setting, PINI relies fundamentally on unfairness to be preserved under composition, making it a poor target property for reasoning about security of autonomous processes.
To prove this, we give two programs which satisfy PINI which fair composition fails to be PINI This same counterexample shows PINI also fails to compose under F .
While PINI may be justifiable if it composes under simpler combinators, it turns out that PINI fails to compose fairly even under products and cascades, as we will see in Section V-B. Finally, p B ∈ PSNI. This means that even if a process is the only PINI process in a composition with PSNI processes, it cannot be guaranteed that the composition even satisfies PINI. The only way we can be sure of this in general is if each PINI process operates in a part of the security lattice disjoint from where all other processes operate, as then, varied presence of output by PINI components will not interfere with the behavior of the other components.
For these reasons, we deem PINI unfit for reasoning about security of autonomous processes.
V. LANGUAGE OF SECURE COMBINATORS
To showcase the generality of our combinator core and compositionality results, we give an rich language of combinators with which to build secure systems from secure parts. Since the combinators are implemented in terms of core combinators, they all compose under PSNI and PINI, and compose fairly under PSNI. Figure 3 contains the full set of binary combinators which, for each component, has a path from input, through it, to output. Some of them appear regularly in literature on compositionality of security properties, e.g. product, (relaxed) cascade and feedback [28] , [32] , [56] . We show how these, and other, combinators can be implemented in terms of our core combinators. For comparison, we have placed their operational semantics in the appendix.
A. Derived Combinators

1) Relaxed Cascade Feedback:
This combinator, denoted ⊗, behaves like , except that input to the composition is only delivered to the left component in the composition. The combinator can therefore be seen as a relaxed relaxed cascade. Using our combinators, we can implement ⊗ as
where
Here, a X is a which message is labeled X (e.g. by partitioning C or V). The label expresses who is the producer behind a; E is the environment, L is p L and R is p R . Thus, for instance, r R (i E ) = ? expresses that p R should not receive a message that originated from the environment.
2) Relaxed Cascade:
This combinator, denoted , is a relaxation of cascade (i.e., sequential) composition often considered in work in compositionality. Like in a cascade, input to a relaxed cascade enters only the first component, and output from the second component is sent only to the environment. However, output from the first component is replicated and sent both to the environment and the second component. Using our core, we can implement as
3) Cascade: Also known as sequential composition, combinator is a basic combinator typically seen as a primitive in various combinator formalisms (e.g. [36] ). Input entering a cascade enters the first component only, output from the first component enters the second component only, and output from the second component becomes the output of the cascade. Using our core, we can implement as
4) Product:
This combinator, denoted ⊕, behaves like without feedback (or alternatively, like parallel composition without sharing [8] ). Such product compositions are frequently considered in work on compositionality (e.g. [28] , [42] ) and taken as a primitive in combinator formalisms (e.g. [36] ). Using our combinators, we can implement ⊕ as
5) Feedback:
A specialization of ⊗, this combinator, denoted , isolates the right-component, making it interact only with the left component. This is useful for modeling interaction with a closed system. We implement as
where This loop combinator avoids the compositionality issues has by storing loop messages in the FIFO p F (which p can consume from at its leisure), instead of jamming them directly into p. This ensures that p can make progress on its outputs.
7)
Generator: Any interactive LTS IO can be used as a source of information / input by never delivering input to it. We define the generator combinator [· as
where r drop (i ) = ? and r drop (o) = o. When used in conjunction with the binary combinators in Figure 3 , we obtain three new combinators for introducing information into a system. These are p ⊕ [p (p streams to the environment), p [p (p streams to p) and p ⊗ [p (p streams to both), the last of which can be illustrated as follows. p p While for r mute (i ) = i and r mute (o) = ! , one might consider including r mute · as a combinator, we find that for any binary combinator , p r mute p behaves either as p or as r mute p (and r mute p is semantically equivalent to F ? (! ω )).
B. Compositionality
Since all of the combinators presented in Figure 3 are specializations of and , we have for all of them, and their counterparts based on instead of , the following compositionality properties. Figure 3 ,
Corollary V.1. For each binary combinator in
For each corresponding operator based on , the same holds.
For · , and its counterpart based on ,
While the above corollary implies that any composite system consisting of PSNI components and combinators in Figure 3 satisfies PSNI regardless of fairness, the same cannot be said about PINI. When fairness is assumed, PINI fails to compose for even simple combinators; the counterexample in the proof of Theorem IV.13 also applies to products ⊕ F and F , and we have pointed out that PINI does not behave well under cascade F (see our rationale for considering PSNI environments when defining PINI E in Section III-C).
C. Building Secure Systems From Parts
By the above result, we now have a rich toolset for building secure wholes from secure parts. Large systems are often developed in a modular manner, in different programming languages, and once deployed, run distributed over a network. Our combinators facilitate end-to-end security, and a divideand-conquer approach to building large secure systems. Parts can be proven secure by use of language-based or languageindependent enforcement mechanisms that target our security properties. Once the parts are proven secure, he have that the whole, assembled using our combinators, is secure. Combinators can be used to model the network topology (how the parts are "hard-wired" or nested), while routers can express data-dependent traffic routing in the network.
The combinators and our system model can also be used to formalize the concurrency semantics in a programming language, like Erlang. Furthermore, by proposing suitable primitive interactive LTS IO , our combinators can be a programming language for writing asynchronous message-passing systems. One could, say, replace with as a primitive, if the routing delay this introduces at the semantics level is not problematic. However, for such a language to be expressive, combinators for programmatically changing the wiring of components (e.g. switches in functional reactive programming [36] and namepassing in process algebra [22] ) should be introduced.
VI. RELATED WORK
To aid in understanding the relative merits of the various models of interaction we are about to discuss, we classify LTS IO based on the interaction behavior they exhibit.
Event systems [20] , [28] , [29] , [31] , [54] , [57] are essentially LTS IO with no restrictions applied. Trace semantics is used as the underlying notion of behavioral equivalence. Compositionality of information flow properties, under a binary operator which implicitly wires matching communication channels internally, has been thoroughly studied in this setting in theories developed for reasoning about compositionality [28] , [32] , [57] . McLean [32] , Zakinthinos and Lee [56] showed that noninference, separability and perfect security are all compositional, and McLean further showed that generalized noninference and generalized noninterference compose under product. Johnson and Thayer showed that forward correctability is fully compositional [25] . McCullough first demonstrated that generalized noninterference is not fully compositional [29] . However, Zakinthinos and Lee have shown that generalized noninterference composes under certain conditions: under a relaxed cascade [55] , if every feedback loop involves at least three components [56] , or if a delay component is inserted into the feedback of high events [55] . Mantel [28] derived all the above results save the last two using his modular assembly kit for security properties (MAKS). He also derived several new conditional compositionality results, and showed that a weakened forward correctability is compositional. Our PSNI composes under routing, product, and under cascade and feedback provided a FIFO is placed between components. Our combinators offer a structured way of composing secure systems from parts; no wiring is implicit, and the possible routes that data can take are clearly defined by structure and routers. Our properties use stream semantics as the underlying behavioral equivalence, which we have argued and demonstrated, makes more, desirable distinctions, enabling us to reject the "extortionist" program given in Section III-D.
Process calculi for security [19] , [22] , [23] , [40] , [46] , [47] have LTS IO as their underlying semantics. They study the use of algebraic properties of concrete concurrency constructs. We are more abstract, providing results for LTS IO directly. We assume input totality in our framework, which induces a concurrency semantics free of output blocking, similar to mailboxes in the Actor model [1] (implemented in Erlang), message queues in JavaScript, and buffered I/O in most programming languages. Assuming input totality simplifies system composition considerably [57] . The parallel composition operator also implicitly wires channels. Bisimulation on processes is typically provided as the primary tool for behavioral reasoning. Since bisimulation is a branching-time, it makes undesired distinctions, which our behavioral equivalence avoids.
Reactive systems [12] , [43] , [58] are, in the sense of Definition VI.1, reactive, input neutral and productive LTS IO . Bohannon et al. [12] present and contrast four stream-based possibilistic noninterference definitions, emphasizing CP-security and ID-security, and give a type-based enforcement of IDsecurity. While ID-security and CP-security do not exclude nondeterministic programs, ID-and CP-security are very restrictive for nondeterministic programs, rejecting programs which conceal information using nondeterministic choice, and therefore essentially becoming as strict as low observational determinism [59] or security under refinement [37] . Our definition of PINI can therefore be perceived as a more faithful generalization of PINI from [3] to nondeterministic systems, or as a generalization of ID-security to nondeterministic systems with intermediate input. We have shown that PINI does not compose under fair schedulers. The counterexamples can easily be expressed in the language of [12] ; thus, ID-security does not compose fairly. While the transducer impression of reactive systems suggests easy composition, reactive systems are not input total; non-willingness of a component to receive can halt progress of another component that wishes to send.
Our security framework most closely resembles the LTS IOand strategy-based frameworks for possibilistic noninterference [16] , [37] , [42] , [44] . O'Neill et al. [37] present a singlethreaded programming language which LTS IO is input neutral, internally-and output-deterministic. The target property is strategy-based PSNI, originally inspired by nondeducibility on strategies by Wittbold and Johnson [54] . Extending the language with nondeterministic choice (making their LTS IO no longer deterministic), they modify PSNI to require noninterference under refinement (arbitrary determinization of all nondeterministic choices prior to execution). Clark and Hunt [16] instead give a possibilistic version of PSNI, show that it is sufficient to guarantee security under deterministic strategies to prove that a program is PSNI, and that stream strategies are sufficient if the program is internally-, inputand output-deterministc, a result used by [12] . In both of these settings, strategies are total; strategies are always willing to receive, and regardless of when and on which channel a program blocks on, the strategy has input available on said channel. While this may be a good fit when strategies model local memory, as demonstrated by Rafnsson et al. [42] , this total strategies assumption ignores classes of realizable attacks which encode secrets in the varied presence of messages in a concurrent setting. This motivates distinguishing between sensitivity of message presence and content, as we do in the present paper, which none of the work discussed so far does, save for [42] - [44] . This idea can be traced back to Sabelfeld and Mantel [48] , who study public (L), encrypted (M) and secret (H) communication channels in a concurrent setting, and Myers [33] , who distinguishes between sensitivity of data structure length and content. Rafnsson et al. [42] show that PSNI composes under product. All three of [16] , [37] , [42] use trace semantics as a basis for behavioral equivalence. We show PSNI composes under all of our combinators, with stream semantics as the basis for behavioral equivalence, and with environments which are part of the computation model.
As an alternative to our trace-and stream-semantics, we could have chosen to express semantics as a function mapping input behaviors to output behaviors. While such a semantics would not give us a complete rule for composition, as the composition would suffer from the Brock-Ackerman anomaly [15] , that issue is resolved by Widom et al. [53] .
Asynchronous testing faces the same difficulties with blocking behavior as we face when putting two LTS IO in interaction. Whereas Verhaard et al. [52] solve the issues by equipping a tester and the implementation under test with an input queue, our assumption of input totality effectively means our interactive systems have input queues baked in. The Input/Output Automata model [27] is very similar to our LTS IO model. It has input totality as a fundamental assumption, and is designed to reason about system composition and fairness. We have not seen this model applied in research on information-flow security. The concurrency semantics induced by our combinators is similar to that employed by signal processing formalisms, like Kahn networks [26] and dataflow programming languages, e.g. Functional Reactive Programming languages [18] , [36] . Indeed, our combinators are reminiscent of the signal function constructors in [36] .
Finally, end-to-end security is easier to achieve if we, alongside combinators which compose secure components securely, have combinators which repair insecurities. Rafnsson and Sabelfeld [43] give such a combinator which puts a logarithmic bound on leaks through progress in a ID-secure program, and Askarov et al. give a combinator which puts a logarithmic bound on leaks through timing observations [5] . Secure Multi-Execution [17] , [44] is a promising new technique which, through program transformation or dynamic monitoring, modifies (modestly) the semantics of any program to become that of a secure program. Devriese and Piessens [17] prove that the approach enforces timing sensitive noninterfence, while Rafnsson and Sabelfeld [44] show that, by relaxing the guarantee to PSNI, the semantics of secure programs can be modified less.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a framework for secure composition. Coming back to the research questions from Section I, we have achieved generality along several dimensions: (i) our underlying systems are general labeled transition systems; (ii) we distinguish between the security level of message presence and content; (iii) our model incorporates environments as part of the system; (iv) our composition is facilitated by a rich set of combinators; and (v) we study both progress-sensitive and progress-insensitive security definitions. While the latter is a popular policy for practical tools, our findings point to the importance of the former in the context of secure system composition. Our findings also provide new insights on the impact of fairness for the security of system composition.
Future work includes investigation of composition in the presence of insecure components. Generalizing the results in this work and our previous results on limiting leakage by programs that satisfy PINI [43] , we plan to extend our combinator set with enhanced combinators that are able to "repair" insecure components and make them readily pluggable into a secure (composed) system. − −−− . We then make sure to not zip beyond the last observable output in t 1 and still get the desired s 2 by replacing the last case in the definition of zip with one which evaluates toõ P .
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